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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of harassment of judgment debtors and multiplicity of suits, are in
no way frustrated by permitting a tenant to counterclaim in an
action commenced by the landlord.
A possible explanation for the court's action is suggested by
the fact that the holding is limited to judgments which are "equal to
or less than the amount of rent due. ' 2 8 It is submitted that the
court wished to provide a tenant with a remedy which would serve
only as a defense in a nonpayment proceeding, rather than grant a
counterclaim which would result in affirmative relief in situations
wherein the prior judgment exceeds the landlord's rent claim.2 2 9
Under either theory, the result in Myack would have been the same
since the judgment involved did not exceed the rent due. Never-
theless, the court's endorsement of the latter approach would have
been more consistent with the current trend towards greater tenant
rights. 230 Although the Myack court clearly recognized the need for
affording tenants greater rights and flexibility in enforcing judg-
ments against their landlords, the court did not go far enough. The
practitioner who represents a tenant in a situation similar to Myack
should certainly attempt to use a prior judgment as a defense of
payment. Where the judgment is greater than the amount of rent
owing, however, the practitioner would be well advised to request
the court to exercise its discretion and allow the tenant's coun-
terclaim on the previously obtained judgment.
DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK PRACTICE
Judicial and legislative pronouncements on citizen-taxpayer standing.
The adjudication of legal interests is governed in part by the
shifting contours of constitutional and institutional standing re-
quirements. Directed at the party seeking access to the judicial
process, the standing doctrine reflects the judiciary's insistence on
an adversary presentation and its interpretation of the proper
228 174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, col. 4 (emphasis in original).
229 The basic difference between a defense and a counterclaim is that a defense "look[s]
only to defeating the plaintiffs claim," 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 3018, commentary at 152
(1974), whereas a counterclaim is proper "whether it will merely diminish or defeat the relief
sought by the plaintiff or it seeks to recover an amount in excess of the plaintiff's claim." 3
WK&M 3019.02, at 30-427.
In Molea v. Eppler, 97 N.Y.S.2d 222 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1950), a defendant tenant
asserted a counterclaim on a 'prior federal judgment which exceeded the landlord's claim,
and the court simply offset the rent due against the prior judgment and granted the tenant a
judgment for the excess. The Myack court noted that but for the fact that Molea involved a
prior federal judgment not subject to the restrictions of CPLR 5014, see note 216 supra, it
would have been persuasive precedent. -174 N.Y.L.J. 105, at 9, col. 4.
230 See note 212 and accompanying text supra.
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allocation of governmental functions. 231 In the past, the New York
Court of Appeals utilized a restrictive approach in granting poten-
tial plaintiffs standing to challenge state legislation and actions of
state officers.2 32 Recent decisions, however, evidence a departure
from the harsh standing requirements that limited access to the
courts.23 3 Effecting a complete reversal of its earlier policy with
respect to the standing of citizen taxpayers to challenge the con-
stitutionality of state fiscal legislation, the decision of the Court in
Boryszewski v. Brydges234 is in line with this trend.
The Boryszewski plaintiffs challenged on constitutional grounds
both the state legislative and executive retirement plan 2 35 as well as
the State's budgeting for lump sum "lulus," i.e. lump sum payments
in lieu of reimbursement for actual expenses incurred by members
of the State Legislature. Treating the action as one for a declara-
tory judgment, 36 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
retirement plan on the merits,2 37 but dismissed that portion of the
231 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83
(1968).
=
2 See, e.g., Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687
(1971) (mem.); Bull v. Stichman, 298 N.Y. 516, 80 N.E.2d 661, aff'g mer. 273 App. Div. 311,
78 N.Y.S.2d 279 (3d Dep't 1948); Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N.Y. 520, 106 N.E. 675 (1914);
Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N.Y. 155 (1858); Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1277-79 (1961).
233See, e.g., Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 339 N.E.2d 865, 377
N.Y.S.2d 451 (1975); Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 324 N.E.2d 317, 364
N.Y.S.2d 830 (1974), discussed in The Survey, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 179, 202 (1975); Burke v.
Sugarman, 35 N.Y.2d 39, 315 N.E.2d 772, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1974), discussed in The Survey,
49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 792, 836 (1975); National Org. for Women v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 34 N.Y.2d 416, 314 N.E.2d 867, 358 N.Y.S.2d 124 (1974); Bloom v. City of New
York, 28 N.Y.2d 952, 271 N.E.2d 919, 323 N.Y.S.2d 436 (1971), aff'g mem. 35 App. Div. 2d
92, 312 N.Y.S.2d 912 (2d Dep't 1970); State Div. of Human Rights v. Adam, Meldrum &
Anderson Co., 84 Misc. 2d 52, 375 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
234 37 N.Y.2d 361, 334 N.E.2d 579, 372 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1975), rev'g 45 App. Div. 2d 789,
357 N.Y.S.2d 149 (3d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
2" The New York State legislative and executive retirement plan is governed by N.Y.
RETIREMENT & Soc. SEC. LAw § 80-a (McKinney Supp. 1975), amending (McKinney 1971).
236 Originally, the papers instituting suit were drafted as an article 78 petition. 37
N.Y.2d at 365, 334 N.E.2d at 581-82, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27. An article 78 proceeding,
however,* is appropriate only when the application of a statute by a state officer is challenged
as unconstitutional. When a blanket challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is desired,
the proper vehicle is an action for a declaratory judgment. 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 7801,
commentary at 12 (Supp. 1975). The Court ignored the procedural defects in plaintiffs'
complaint, however, and, pursuant to CPLR 103(c), treated the action as one for a declara-
tory judgment, 37 N.Y.2d at 365, 334 N.E.2d at 581-82, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626-27, CPLR
103(c) permits a court to utilize its discretion and treat an action as properly brought to
avoid dismissal of that which was brought in an improper form. See, e.g., Jerry v. Board of
Educ., 35 N.Y.2d 534, 544-45, 324 N.E.2d 106, 111-12, 364 N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1974);
Overhill Bldg. Co. v. Delany, 28 N.Y.2d 449, 457-58, 271 N.E.2d 537, 542, 322 N.Y.S.2d
696, 703 (1971); Lakeland Water Dist. v. Onondaga County Water Auth., 24 N.Y.2d 400,
408, 248 N.E.2d 855, 859, 301 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7 (1969); Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Procaccino,
378 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975); 1 WK&M 103.08; 3 id. 3001.06g.
" 37 N.Y.2d at 366-68, 334 N.E.2d at 582-84, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 627-29.
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complaint dealing with the lump sum "lulus" for failure to state a
cause of action.238 Judge Jones observed that the instant decision
granting standing to citizen taxpayers brings New York into con-
formity with the practice of the majority of states239 as well as that
in New York at the local level.240 The Boryszewski Court expressly
overruled St. Clair v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc.,241 and its progeny,242
explaining its change of attitude as consonant with developing
public policy.243 In departing from such previous denials of stand-
ing to plaintiffs not personally aggrieved but simply similarly
situated with others adversely affected by state legislative action,
the Court has approved the assertion of a public interest as
sufficient to confer standing upon citizen taxpayers.244
Noting the unlikelihood that public officials would challenge
the constitutionality of their own acts, especially when personally
238 Id. at 368, 334 N.E.2d at 584, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 630. In dismissing that portion of the
complaint dealing with the lump sum "lulus," the Court noted that the complaint was
imprecisely drawn and that plaintiffs had failed to utilize CPLR 3211 (c) to enable themselves
to plead again if the motion to dismiss was granted. Id.239 Id. at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626. In Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1278 (1961), New York and New Mexico were
cited as the only two states that expressly prohibited taxpayer suits. A recent New Mexico
case, however, indicates that the standing doctrine in that jurisdiction is being reevaluated.
See De Vargas Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Campbell, 87 N.M. 469, 535 P.2d 1320 (1975).
240 37 N.Y.2d at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626. Pursuant to N.Y. GEN.
MUNic. LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1975), a person or corporation liable to pay taxes on a
minimum $1000 assessment has standing to challenge allegedly illegal acts of persons acting
on behalf of a municipality. An action may also be maintained to prevent waste or injury to
the funds or property of the municipality. Section 51, however, does not authorize actions to
challenge legislative policy or administrative discretion on the local level. See Gaynor v.
Rockefeller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 133-34, 204 N.E.2d 627, 634, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584, 594 (1965);
Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 79, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (1953); Kelly v. Merry, 262 N.Y.
151, 160, 186 N.E. 425, 428 (1933). On the state level, citizen-taxpayer standing has been
governed by decisional law, but limited exceptions may be found. See, e.g., N.Y. Co"'sT. art.
XIV, § 5 (citizen suit to protect forest preserves, reservoirs, wildlife, and environment); N.Y.
Civ. SERV. LA%, § 102 (McKinney 1973) (citizen-taxpayer suit to restrain or recover payment
of compensation in violation of law).
241 13 N.Y.2d 72, 192 N.E.2d 15, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 970
(1964) (citizen taxpayers denied standing to challenge statutory reduction of pari-mutuel
tax). For a discussion of St. Clair and citizen-taxpayer suits in New York see Quirk, Standing
to Sue in New York, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 429 (1973).
242 See, e.g., Taylor v. Sise, 33 N.Y.2d 357, 308 N.E.2d 442, 352 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1974);
Hidley v. Rockefeller, 28 N.Y.2d 439, 271 N.E.2d 530, 322 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1971) (mem.);
Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970, 259 N.E.2d 484, 311 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1970) (mem.); Bell
v. Levitt, 44 App. Div. 2d 742, 354 N.Y.S.2d 465 (3d Dep't) (mem.), leave to appeal denied, 34
N.Y.2d 518, 316 N.E.2d 883, 359 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1974); State Ass'n of Chiefs of Police v.
Municipal Police Training Council, 82 Misc. 2d 289, 368 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1975). The Court has put aside this line of cases denying citizen taxpayers standing,
however, when presented with a constitutional issue which if left undecided would have
troublesome consequences. See, e.g., Spillane v. Katz, 25 N.Y.2d 34, 250 N.E.2d 44, 302
N.Y.S.2d 546 (1969) (per curiam).
243 37 N.Y.2d at 363, 334 N.E.2d at 580, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
244 Id. See generally Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1971); Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review': Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 305 (1961).
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benefited thereby, as well as the general responsibility of state
officials to uphold and support action taken by the various
branches of state government, 45 the Court reasoned that con-
tinued exclusion of the citizen taxpayer from access to the courts
would necessarily diminish the possibility of judicial review of state
legislative and executive action.246 Accordingly, Judge Jones ob-
served that the denial of standing in cases like Boryszewski would
"erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of legislative
action. 24
7
The Court's opinion must be read carefully to ascertain its
intended scope. Although Judge Jones initially stated the Court's
holding as granting "a taxpayer . . . standing to challenge [the
constitutionality of] enactments of our State Legislature,' 248 it is clear
from the Court's later references to the plaintiffs that they were
granted standing not by reason of their status as taxpayers, but as
citizen taxpayers.2 49 It further appears that "enactments" should be
construed narrowly in keeping with the context of the action be-
fore the Court. As Judge Gabrielli pointed out in his concurring
opinion, the Boryszewski Court was not confronted with the issue of
standing in a "friendly" suit or a suit challenging administrative
action, but with the issue of standing in a constitutional challenge
brought by citizen taxpayers questioning fiscal enactments.2 5 0 Im-
plicit in the majority opinion is the reemergence of a more favor-
able attitude towards grants of standing in citizen mandamus pro-
ceedings. 25' Yet, the Boryszewski decision must be viewed as being
24 37 N.Y.2d at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 63(1),
71 (McKinney 1972), which obligates the attorney general to defend the State, illustrates the
general responsibility of state officials to support the action taken by the various branches of
the State's government. Indeed, in Boryszewski the attorney general represented defendant
Brydges, who was sued in his capacity as majority leader and temporary president of the
State Senate. 37 N.Y.2d at 362, 334 N.E.2d at 580, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
216 37 N.Y.2d at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626. Accord, St. Clair v.
Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 72, 79, 192 N.E.2d 15, 18, 242 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (1963)
(Fuld, J., dissenting). Support for the Court's reasoning may be found in 175 N.Y.L.J. 98,
Nov. 20, 1975, at 2, col. 5, where it is reported that the attorney general denied requests to
investigate a public interest group's allegations concerning "no-show" jobs in the State
Legislature, thereby forcing that group to take action on its own.
24737 N.Y.2d at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626.248 Id. at 362, 334 N.E.2d at 580, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 624 (emphasis added).
24 See id. at 363-64, 334 N.E.2d at 580-81, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 625-26.
230 37 N.Y.2d 368, 369, 334 N.E.2d 584, 585, 372 N.Y.S.2d 630, 631 (Gabrielli, J.,
concurring in result only).
221 The petitioner in a citizen mandamus proceeding operates as a mere instrument of
the public interest to compel performance of a public duty, whereas the plaintiff in a
taxpayer action represents his pecuniary, albeit nominal, interest as a taxpayer. See L. JAFFE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 468, 468-75, 531-36 (1965).
In the past, citizen mandamus proceedings were frequently entertained by the Court of
Appeals. See, e.g., Chironna v. Watson, 304 N.Y. 255, 259, 107 N.E.2d 289, 290 (1952) (per
curiam); Cash v. Bates, 301 N.Y. 258, 261, 93 N.E.2d 835, 836 (1950); Kuhn v. Curran, 294
1976]
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limited to the issue before the Court. For this reason, the Court's
references to challenges of state executive action 252 must also be
viewed as dictum.
Interestingly, the Boryszewski decision immediately preceded
the legislature's enactment of article 7-A of the State Finance
Law. " 3 Designed to reverse over a century of judicial prohibition
of citizen-taxpayer suits, the new article permits such suits for the
purpose of challenging illegal or unconstitutional disbursements of
state funds by state officers and employees. 54 Simultaneous
liberalization by the judiciary and the legislature, however, has left
the doctrine of citizen-taxpayer standing in a seemingly nebulous
position. 255 Apparently, while Boryszewski will control unconstitu-
tional fiscal acts of the State Legislature, article 7-A of the State
Finance Law will be applicable to illegal or unconstitutional dis-
bursements of funds by state officers or employees. Conceptually,
such a distinction may be valid, but there are situations in which
there would be little practical difference.25 6 Thus, although article
N.Y. 207, 213, 61 N.E.2d 513, 515 (1945); Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 281, 14 N.E.2d
65, 69 (1938); McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N.Y. 401,410-11, 153 N.E. 849, 851 (1926); People ex
rel. Pumpyansky v. Keating, 168 N.Y. 390, 393, 61 N.E. 637 (1901); People ex rel. Stephens v.
Halsey, 37 N.Y. 344, 347-48 (1867); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.10
(1958); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265,
1276-78 (1961). In Donohue v. Cornelius, 17 N.Y.2d 390, 218 N.E.2d 285,271 N.Y.S.2d 231
(1966), however, a citizen was denied standing to challenge the validity of an act of a state
official because he was not personally aggrieved. As one notable authority has pointed out,
this decision created much confusion with respect to citizen mandamus proceedings in New
York. See 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.10 (Supp. 1970). The Boryszewski
Court considered the Donohue decision "very much tempered" by Burke v. Sugarman, 35
N.Y.2d 39, 315 N.E.2d 772, 358 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1974), wherein the inconsistency of Donohue
was noted, but held not to be controlling on the facts presented. 37 N.Y.2d at 363, 334
N.E.2d at 580, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 625. Such a statement, however, does not appear warranted
upon a reading of that decision. See The Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 792, 838-39 (1975).2
.
2 See 37 N.Y.2d at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (dictum). The issue of
standing with respect to challenges of state executive action may be altogether academic,
however, since the legislature enacted N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW art. 7-A (McKinney Supp. 1975).
251 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW §§ 123 to 123-j (McKinney Supp. 1975) became effective
September 1, 1975. Ch. 827, § 2, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1310 (McKinney).254 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LaW § 123 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
255 Evidence of the nebulous position occupied by the doctrine of citizen-taxpayer
standing may be ascertained by reading the comments and recommendations made to the
Governor prior to his approval of article 7-A. This information may be found in the contents
of the bill jacket to ch. 827, §§ 1-2, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1307 (McKinney). Some organizations
and agencies felt that article 7-A could supersede the judicial grant of standing in Boryszeuski.
See, e.g., Letter from Department of Audit and Control to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to
Governor Carey, Aug. 6, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office; Letter from
Division of the Budget to Governor Carey, July 29, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review
Office; Letter from Office of Court Administration to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor
Carey, July 25, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office; Letter from New York
Public Interest Research Group to Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor Carey, July 24, 1975,
on file in the St. John's Law Review Office. Additionally, it was noted that the inconsistent
legislative and judicial approaches could cause confusion as to their respective applicability.
See, e.g., Letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Judah Gribetz,
Counsel to Goyernor Carey, Aug. 8, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office.
256 For example, if a citiien taxpayer were to seek to challenge the constitutionality of a
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7-A was intended to legislate a new standing doctrine, it may, in
effect, be superimposing new rules upon a developing judicial
doctrine.257 .Additionally, many provisions of article 7-A itself are
in need of clarification or explanation.
The definitions of a number of the terms employed in this new
legislation cause some preliminary problems of construction. Un-
defined, and therefore a possible source of litigation, is the terin
"state officer or employee. '2 58  Although a state legislator is
elsewhere included within the definition of a "state officer, ' 25 9 his
decisionmaking duties do not appear to be within the ambit of
article 7-A. 260 If this is indeed the case, there can be no apprehen-
sion that article 7-A has superseded Boryszewski.
Section 123-a 261 defines "taxpayer" as "any citizen who has
fiscal enactment, his decision to proceed against the statute itself or against the state officer
charged with its administration would determine the procedural aspects of his action. If the
statute itself were not unconstitutional there would, of course, be no overlap.
One area that may cause difficult problems concerns the issuance of bonds. If a citizen
taxpayer were to seek to challenge the issuance of "Big Mac" bonds as illegal or unconstitu-
tional pursuant to article 7-A of the State Finance Law, for example, his action would be
dismissed since it has been specifically precluded by the article. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 123-b
(McKinney Supp. 1975). See text accompanying note 268 infra. If, however, the same citizen
taxpayer were to challenge the constitutionality of the legislative authorization to issue "Big
Mac" bonds, his action presumably would be maintainable under Boryszewski.
2'7 The new rules of standing could be developed by the courts or through legislative
codification of Boryszewski. Although legislative participation in the formulation of standing
requirements could lead to a more consistent approach, the propriety of legislative reform of
a judicially developed doctrine may be questioned.
2'8 See, e.g., Corcoran v. State, 24 N.Y.2d 922, 249 N.E.2.d 764,301 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1969),
aff'g mem. 30 App. Div. 2d 991, 294 N.Y.S.2d 171 (3d Dep't 1968) (district attorney and
county judge not state officers within meaning of Court of Claims Act); Fisher v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 60, 176 N.E.2d 72, 217 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1961) (assistant district attorney not state officer
within meaning of Public Officers Law); Benvenga v. La Guardia, 294 N.Y. 526, 63 N.E.2d
88 (1945) (supreme court justices are state officers within meaning of Public Officers Law);
New York City Employees' Retirement Sys. v. Eliot, 267 N.Y. 193, 196 N.E. 23 (1935)
(members of state licensing board are state officers within meaning of Public Officers Law);
McArdle v. Temporary State Comm'n of Investigation, 41 App. Div. 2d 401, 343 N.Y.S.2d
1001 (3d Dep't 1973) (per curiam) (members of temporary state commission are state
officials for purposes of denying ex parte stay against them); Isereau v. State, 207 Misc. 665,
139 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Ct. Cl. 1954), aff'd mem. sub nom. Farley v. State, 3 App. Div. 2d 813, 160
N.Y.S.2d 839 (4th Dep't 1957) and Walker v. State, 3 App. Div. 2d 812, 160 N.Y.S.2d 840
(4th Dep't 1957) (county sheriff and his agents not state officials within meaning of Court of
Claims Act and Public Officers Law).
259 N.Y. PUB. OFFICERs LAW § 2 (McKinney 1952) (state officer defined).26
° See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (legislative purpose). State
legislatures typically are allowed wide discretion and flexibility in their control of the fiscal
systems of the State. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159-60 (1930); Gautier
v. Ditmar, 204 N.Y. 20, 97 N.E. 464 (1912). It should be noted, however, that some may use
article 7-A to challenge state fiscal legislation since it is arguable that an unconstitutional
motive on the part of the legislators would bring their actions within the purview of the
statute. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional,.
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). Moreover, there may be situations in which
members of the executive, legislative, or judiciary branches of our state government are
responsible for actually administering public funds and will therefore be open to a challenge
through an article 7-A action.
261 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-a (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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paid or is paying state income or state sales taxes"; "citizen" as "any
person who is a resident of the state"; and "person" as any individ-
ual, the attorney general, any political subdivision, corporation, "or
any other legal entity whatsoever." In contrast, Boryszewski defined
neither citizen nor taxpayer. 262 Reference 263 was made, however, to
section 51 of the General Municipal Law, which authorizes tax-
payer actions to restrain illegal official acts on the local level and
includes within its grant of standing any person or corporation who
is liable for the payment of local real estate taxes.2 64 In addition to
article 7-A, therefore, courts may look to section 51 for guidance in
resolving the procedural issues attendant to plaintiff's standing to
maintain an action under Boryszewski.
Section 123-b of the State Finance Law grants citizen taxpayers
standing to challenge, in an action for equitable or declaratory
relief, "wrongful expenditure, misappropriation, misapplication, or
any other illegal or unconstitutional disbursement of state funds or
state property 2 65 and thereby authorizes litigation in a wide area
of fiscal operations. Concern has been voiced over the possible
obstruction and delay this section could cause needed public works
projects26 6 as well as over the extraordinary damages the State and
its political subdivisions could be exposed to should such an action
be entertained with respect to an ongoing operation. 67 The section
262 In different contexts, the terms "citizen" and "taxpayer" may be subject to varying
interpretations. For example, a corporation is not always considered a citizen. See, e.g., Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) (not a citizen for purposes of privileges and
immunities clause of U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2); Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis
Provision Co., 169 N.Y. 506, 62 N.E. 587 (1902), aff'd, 191 U.S. 376 (1903) (not a citizen of
the state in the constitutional sense); J.D.L. Corp. v. Bruckman, 171 Misc. 3, 11 N.Y.S.2d 741
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1939) (corporation not vested with all rights of citizenship inherent
in natural person).
26 37 N.Y.2d at 364, 334 N.E.2d at 581, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
264 N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. Law § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
265 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 123-b (McKinney Supp. 1975).
266 Letter from Associated General Contractors of America, New York State Chapter, to
Judah Gribetz, Counsel to Governor Carey, July 15, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law
Review Office.
26 Letter from Executive Department Office of General Services to Judah Gribetz,
Counsel to Governor Carey, July 31, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office. The
Mayor of the City of New York objected to § 123-b because it permits a plaintiff to join as a
party defendant the recipient of the funds being challenged and would therefore subject the
city to additional litigation expenses. Letter from the Office of the Mayor of the City of New
York to Governor Carey, July 29, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office.
The applicable statute of limitations is also a cause of great concern to potential
defendants in an article 7-A action. Such an action would generally appear to be governed
by the 6-year residual statute of limitations found in CPLR 213(1). If, however, the action is
brought by the State and based on spoliation or misappropriation of public property, the
applicable period would be either 6 years or 2 years from actual or imputed discovery,
whichever is longer. CPLR 213(5), 203(f). Both these periods are substantially longer than
the statute of limitations generally applied to an article 78 proceeding. See CPLR 217
(4-month statute of limitations for article 78 proceeding unless shorter period provided),
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specifically exempts from its coverage, however, the issuance of
bonds, thereby saving "Big Mac" and other public debt security
issuers the necessity of defending challenges brought pursuant to
article 7-A. Bond authorizations were given no such protection in
Boryszewski. 268
Venue for an article 7-A action lies in the supreme court of
any county where the disbursement has occurred or where the
state officer has his principal office. 269 No reference is made, how-
ever, to CPLR 506(b), which places venue in Albany County for
proceedings against bodies or officers connected with certain spec-
ified agencies. While this lack of collation has been viewed by some
as a source of potential difficulty,27 ° it is suggested that these
sections may be reconciled since one refers to an action and the
other to a special proceeding.271
In an article 7-A action the court, in its discretion, is au-
thorized to demand that the plaintiff post up to $2500 as security
for costs and taxable disbursements.272 Presumably, this provision
was designed to discourage the institution of frivolous suits that
would unnecessarily disrupt agency action. Similar considerations
would seem pertinent to constitutional challenges of legislative
enactments. Therefore, although the issue of security did not arise
in Boryszewski, it would be helpful if the courts had the power to
require such a posting in future applications of that decision.273
Section 123-e of the State Finance Law authorizes the court to
grant preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders as
discussed in 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 217, commentary at 506 (1972); 1 WK&M 217.01; and 8
id. 7801.01.
In contrast, an action under Boryszezski in which a citizen taxpayer is seeking a declara-
tory judgment as to the constitutionality of a statute is one for which there may be no
applicable statute of limitations. See 1 WK&M 213.02; 3 id. 3001.19.265 See note 256 supra.
9 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-c (McKinney Supp. 1975).
270 See, e.g., Letter from the Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets to Judah Gribetz,
Counsel to Governor Carey, Aug. 8, 1975, on file in the St. John's Law Review Office.271 The implied repeal of an earlier statute by a subsequently enacted statute is not
favored and will only be resorted to if there is irreconcilable conflict between the two
provisions. See People v. Mann, 31 N.Y.2d 253, 257-59, 288 N.E.2d 595, 597-98, 336
N.Y.S.2d 633, 636-37 (1972); O'Brien v. McGinnis, 63 Misc. 2d 170, 172-74, 311 N.Y.S.2d
553, 556-58 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1970); People v. Heath, 77 Misc. 2d 215, 218-19, 352
N.Y.S.2d 863, 867-68 (Schuyler County Ct. 1974); N.Y. STATS. §§ 391, 392, 398 (McKinney
1971); IA J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (4th ed. C.
Sands 1972). The distinction between the two different types of civil judicial proceedings, an
action and a special proceeding, has been greatly diminished by CPLR 103(b), which
provides that unless otherwise authorized by law the procedural requirements of an action
shall apply to a special proceeding.
272 N.Y. STATE FIN. Law § 123-d (McKinney Supp. 1975).
273 It is interesting to note that N.Y. GEN. MUNIc. LAw § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1975)
requires the plaintiff to furnish a bond of not less than $250.
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well as declaratory relief and other forms of equitable relief.2 4 It
carves out an exception to the general provisions of CPLR 6313(a),
which prohibit the issuance of a temporary restraining order
against a public officer. No exception having been made with
respect to CPLR 6312(b), a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion would presumably have to comply with that provision's re-
quirement of an undertaking.27 5 The court also has authority,
under section 12 3 -g of the State Finance Law, to award a successful
plaintiff reimbursement for costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees.2 7 6
Reimbursement is to be made through a special "citizen and tax-
payer suit fund," which will be financed by monies recovered
under the article.277 Although the Boryszewski Court was not in a
position to consider this issue, a disposition in favor of awarding
attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff in similar actions might be
anticipated.2 78
274 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 123-e (McKinney Supp. 1975). In addition to authorizing the
grant of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, this section authorizes
the court to grant restitution to the State. If the funds have already been expended the state
officer or employee responsible for the disbursement would be required to make such
restitution himself. Id. Notably, however, this requirement conflicts with N.Y. PuB. OFFICERS
LAw § 17 (McKinney Supp. 1975), which provides for indemnification of state officers and
employees so long as the illegal act they committed was neither willful nor the result of gross
negligence.
An additional conflict arises where the attorney general himself is prosecuting the
action. Where indemnification of the state officer or employee is authorized, he must notify
the attorney general who may then assume control of his defense. Id. Thus, the attorney
general may find himself both prosecuting and defending the same action. Even if such a
predicament were to exist, the action could not be compromised, discontinued, or dismissed
without court approval. N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 123-f (McKinney Supp. 1975).
215 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAw § 123-i (McKinney Supp. 1975) (existing rights of actions or
remedies preserved).
276 Id. § 12 3 -g. This provision, however, would not allow a successful intervenor to
recover attorneys' fees unless he were found to be a necessary party. Id. Although this
provision of the State Finance Law was probably enacted to ensure that the fund established
for this purpose will remain solvent, barring recovery of attorneys' fees by an intervenor
might encourage the institution of separate and independent suits, as opposed to a single
action wherein multiple approaches to the issue could be litigated together.2771d. § 123-h. Under this provision, only amounts in excess of $100,000 will be
returned to the general fund of the State. Additionally, the first suit maintained under this
article may leave the plaintiff without reimbursement for his expenses since no money was
appropriated to initiate the fund.
278 Successful plaintiffs who bring an action under Boryszewski should direct the court's
attention to id. § 123-g and Nance v. Town of Oyster Bay, 54 Misc. 2d 274, 282 N.Y.S.2d 324
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967), aff'd mem., 30 App. Div. 2d 918, 293 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2d Dep't
1968), wherein successful plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees based on equitable princi-
ples in their action brought pursuant to N.Y. GEN. MUNIC. LAv § 51 (McKinney Supp.
1975).
It may be argued that societal interests will be best served through public interest
litigation if a successful plaintiff is awarded his attorneys' fees, for although standing is
granted it may be economically infeasible for the plaintiff to maintain the suit. See
Nussbaum, Attorneys Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 301 (1973). Since the
suit is not maintained to recover damages and attorneys' fees are only awarded to a
successful litigant, there would seem to be little danger that the award of attorneys' fees in
such actions would encourage frivolous suits. Id. at 333.
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These long overdue recognitions of standing afford the public
greater participation in the governmental process. Although article
7-A of the State Finance Law provides for guidelines absent in
Boryszewski, further legislative and judicial clarification and explana-
tion of both the article and the case law is needed.279 This articula-
tion must not be delayed, for uncertainty as to threshold require-
ments such as standing overly encumber the decision to initiate an
otherwise meritorious action. The practitioner should be aware of
the inconsistencies between article 7-A and Boryszewski as well as the
issues posed by a close examination of article 7-A itself and frame
his standing argument accordingly.
Legislature's attempt to meet medical malpractice crisis.
The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance 28 0 has caused
consternation within the medical profession. Pressured by the
doubling of premium costs and the possibility that many insurance
companies might curtail or abolish protection, doctors across the
country have protested by staging or threatening. strikes.281 In New
York, the threat of a walkout by the medical profession induced
the legislature282 to extensively revise the law of medical malprac-
tice .2 83 The major changes became effective July 1, 1975 and apply
to acts of malpractice occurring on or after that date.284
One of the enactments provided for the creation of a medical
malpractice insurance association. 28 5 Composed of "all insurers au-
279 Clarification should be based on an evaluation of the various public policy consid-
erations underlying the different treatment accorded actions under the State Finance Law,
the General Municipal Law, and Boryszew'ski. It is submitted that a consistent overall ap-
proach to citizen-taxpayer actions would be preferable.
280 Insurance costs have risen astronomically. As of 1975, the rates averaged 16 times
those charged in 1966, with further increases predicted in the near future. N.Y. Times, June
1, 1975, § 1 (News), at 47, col. 5.
It is interesting to note that as of 1975 more than 7000 of the 12,000 physicians
practicing in New York City and Nassau County were paying premiums of $2067 or less. Id.,
June 1, 1975, § 1 (News), at 46, col, 3. When compared to other insurance expenses, such as
automobile coverage, this amount does not seem excessive. While it is true that some
physicians in high-risk specialties pay top premiums of up to $14,329, id., these physicians
usually charge higher fees for their services.
21 E.g., id., May 2, 1975, at 1, col. 1; id. May 21, 1975, at 30, col. 6 (doctors' strike on
West Coast).2 2 MId., May 16, 1975, at 1, col. 3.
283 Ch. 109, §9 1-37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 134 (McKinney) (codified in scattered sections of
N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw; CPLR; N.Y. EDUC. LAW; N.Y. INS. LAw; N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw; N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw; N.Y. WORKMEN'S CoMP. LAw). While there is no general definition of
medical malpractice applicable to the whole package of malpractice legislation, the term is
defined in the enactment's amendment to the Insurance Law to include liability for death or
injury caused by a "licensed physician or hospital." N.Y. INS. LAw § 681(2) (McKinney Supp.
1975). Perhaps that definition will be held to apply to other statutes in the new legislation as
well. See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3403, commentary at 13 (Supp. 1975).
284 Ch. 109, § 37, [1975] N.Y. Laws 157 (McKinney).
2-'5 N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 681-95 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
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